This research examined how phenomenology critically expands upon the descriptive narrative developed by German idealism, which interprets the history of metaphysics not merely as a simple narrative but as a connection of philosophical problems, and how phenomenology situates itself within this description of the history of metaphysics.

    To this end, the study took Schelling’s description of the history of philosophy as a guiding thread and examined it in the light of studies on the history of philosophy conducted by modern French historians of philosophy such as Étienne Gilson and Olivier Boulnois. Through a close examination of the relevant texts of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, the study demonstrated how these authors and their texts are read by phenomenologists such as Heidegger, Edith Stein, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida and Marc Richir and how these readings lead to innovations in phenomenology.

    The main outcomes of this research are as follows:

1) The research demonstrates how Levinas interprets Plato’s Parmenides and how he focuses on Plato’s concept of to exaiphnēs (‘the suddenly’) to superimpose it upon his own discussion surrounding his concepts of subject (the I) as ‘the One’ and time as diachrony.

2) The research illustrates how Derrida superimposes Gilson’s discussion of the contrast between Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus onto his own discussion of the contrast between Heidegger and Levinas and what Derrida derives from this superimposition. Furthermore, the study shows how Derrida examines Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s Symposium and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics presented in The Question Concerning Technology and other texts and how Derrida draws on this reading to address the question of alterity intervening poiēsis (‘production’).

3) The study clarifies Schelling’s description of the history of philosophy, as outlined in The Essence of Human Freedom and other texts, by contrasting it with Boulnois’s Scotus studies. On the basis of this clarification, this study examines how Richir interprets Schelling and Heidegger’s reading of Schelling in order to move from phenomenology as eidetics to a phenomenology that describes what precedes thought, namely what he calls ‘unprethinkable’ (imprépensable), borrowing Schelling’s term (unvordenklich).