This research is an attempt to clarify how the metaphysical turn in contemporary German and French phenomenology inherits the critique of ontotheology in ancient and mediaeval Western philosophy. Thereby, this study redefines this new turn by situating it within the history of metaphysics. To this end, the research not only references Tengelyi's perspective, which situates German and French phenomenology within the history of Western philosophy (The World and the Infinite), but also independently explores its inheritance of ancient and mediaeval metaphysics from the following three perspectives:

(i) Levinas's inheritance of Maimonides's critique of Aristotle ('The Actuality of Maimonides', God, Death and Time).

(ii) Derrida's questioning of Heidegger's critique of mediaeval interpretations of Aristotle (Theory and Practice).

(iii) Richir's examination of late Schelling's concepts of eternity and creation against the backdrop of Aristotle's philosophy as inherited by the Middle Ages (Experience of Thinking).

　With these three perspectives, this study unveils the background – in ancient and mediaeval philosophy – for the turn of modern phenomenology towards a non-ontotheological metaphysics. The findings of this research include the discovery that the background of Levinas's criticism of Aristotle's philosophy – as the emergence of ontotheology – lies in Maimonides's refutation of Aristotle. The research focuses on Heidegger's claim, together with Derrida, that mediaeval Latin philosophy distorted Aristotle's concept of cause, and an attempt to reconcile this claim with Boulnois's three categories of 13th century metaphysics to consider these divergent interpretations in a consistent manner. Finally, Schelling's 'Other deduction of the principles of positive philosophy' – with its close reading by Richir in Experience of Thinking – is challenged. From this, it is deciphered that Schelling's positive philosophy, which explains eternity from creation rather than placing eternity and creation in opposition to each other, does not mark a return to ontotheology but is precisely a break from ontotheology.