表題番号:2020E-001 日付:2021/01/15
研究課題A Comprehensive Evaluation of the Hospital Payment System in Japan
研究者所属(当時) 資格 氏名
(代表者) 商学学術院 商学部 講師 富 蓉
研究成果概要
Countries seeking to move away from a purely fee‐for‐service (FFS) system
may consider a hybrid approach whereby only some procedures are paid by
FFS while others are paid prospectively. Yet little evidence exists whether such
a hybrid payment system contains overall costs without adverse influences on
health outcomes. In 2003, Japan experienced a reform from FFS to a hybrid
payment system in which only some inpatient procedures were paid prospectively.
We exploit this reform to test how such a hybrid system affects
overall costs and health outcomes. Briefly, we find that healthcare providers
responded opportunistically to the reform, moving some procedures out of the
bundled inpatient setting to FFS services, leading to no reduction in cost.
There was some evidence of a moderate deterioration in health outcomes, in
terms of a decline in the probability of symptoms being cured at discharge. In
sum, our results suggest that in some cases, a hybrid payment system can be
non‐superior to either FFS or a prospective payment system.