We analyse human decision-making in incentivized laboratory settings to answer fundamental questions about how people think about the conflict situations they face and to better understand their behavior. We complement the results presented by Veszteg and Funaki (2018) by using a broader and more systematic selection of symmetric situations.

Our preliminary results, based on data gathered at Waseda SPSE in January 2020, point to the following directions.

* The largest differences between induced and perceived conflicts (i.e., monetary incentives and utility) appear in situations known as battle of the sexes, anti-battle of the sexes, and coordination games.

* Rationality (both based on monetary gains and declared satisfaction levels) ranges from 17% to 97% across situations. The lowest "performing" ones (in terms of both) are the prisoner's dilemma (43%), chicken (33%, 23%), battles of the sexes (40%, 33%) and anti-battle of the sexes (17%, 23%). These are also the ones with the least number of equilibrium strategy choices (below 63%).

* There is no significant correlation between game-theoretical rationality and the decision-maker's social-value orientation, nor maximization score.

* The occurence of mixed strategies is 24% across all situations, and 36% in those with an equilibrium in mixed strategies.