表題番号：2016S-121
日付：2017/03/30
研究課題新たな超越論哲学の基礎としての、経験的改訂を容れる「ア・プリオリ」概念の彫琢
| 研究者所属（当時） | 資格 | 氏名 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| （代表者） | 社会科学総合学術院 社会科学部 | 准教授 | 千葉 清史 |
- 研究成果概要
- In this research, I have examined the ideas of “empirically defeasible a priori” in the current analytical epistemology, especially those developed by Laurence BonJour’s In Defense of Pure Reason (1998) and Albert Casullo’s A Priori Justification (2003). The main outcomes are: (1) The primary content of the “a priori” is the independence of experience. According to this, the concept of “empirically defeasible a priori” seems to be inconsistent. Against such an appearance, it can be shown that the “empirically defeasible a priori” can be coherent, even respectable for traditional apriorists (such as Kantians). (2) The central apprehension of opponents to the a priori in general, that a priori justifications cannot be reconciled with naturalism, has not yet been wiped out sufficiently, even by the detailed arguments by BonJour and Casullo; some further defense of the reality of a priori justifications are necessary. (3) BonJour’s idea that a priori justifications are based on “rational insights” deserves further development, thought it still has some insufficiencies and unclarities many critics have pointed out. My hypothesis is that this idea can be enriched in combination with the Kantian so called “transcendental” strategy.