表題番号：2016K-008
日付：2017/03/20
研究課題金融危機における政策金融の経済厚生評価
| 研究者所属（当時） | 資格 | 氏名 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| （代表者） | 政治経済学術院 政治経済学部 | 教授 | 小倉 義明 |
- 研究成果概要
- I found evidence that government-controlled banks significantly increased their lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) whose main bank is a large bank in the 2007-09 financial crisis. Further analyses show that both the weak relationship between large banks and SMEs, which is characterized by lower deposit and loan shares, and the crowding-out due to the loan demand surge among large corporations, which were temporarily shut out of the securities market, contributed to this phenomenon. The mixed Cournot oligopoly model including a government-controlled bank, a profit-maximizing main bank providing a differentiated service, which is characterized by an implicit insurance for a relational borrower against a temporary financial distress, and other profit-maximizing banks providing a non-differentiated service shows that the above finding regarding the weak relationship is consistent with the welfare maximization by a government-controlled bank rather than its own profit maximization. This finding provides evidence for the role of government-controlled banks as a shock absorber against a financial crisis.